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Editor's Note: In Part One of this article, published in the last 
issue, Professor Horowitz noted the rapid legal change taking place in 
many parts of the world. Widespread Isl,amic law reform forms a 
prominent part of the process of change. Professor Horowitz pointed 
out that there is an inadequate supply of good theory to -explain the 
sources and the directions of legal change, particularly theory that is 
genuinely comparative, and he then provided a critical survey of the 
main theoretical approaches that might be brought to bear on the 
problem of change. Thereafter, Professor Horowitz laid out the con-
tours of the extensive statutory changes that have taken place in Ma-
laysian Islamic law, explaining that the Malaysian drafters had 
borrowed freely, both from other Islamic systems and from British-
derived secular law, which has strong roots in Malaysia. 
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In Part Two, Professor Horowitz shows the powerful influence of 
common law methods on legal reasoning, on the reshaping of old Is-
lamic law doctrines and the creation of wholly new obligations, and 
on the legal process in general. He then reevaluates the predominant 
approaches to legal change and makes the case for legal accultura-
tion-a syncretic process by which the norms of one system infuse 
those of another, without necessarily . undermining the latter's 
authenticity. 
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PART Two 
IV. ,JUDICIAL DOCTRINE: A COMMON LAw OF SHARIAH 
Proponents of Islamic reform in Malaysia have not been content 
to move the law along by means of legislative enactment alone: case 
law has also been a vehicle. Here the most visible evidence is heavily 
in the appeal boards and committees of jurisdictions following the 
Federal Territory model, two of them in particular. The decisions of 
these appellate bodies are replete with secular methods of statutory 
interpretation, applied even to sacred sources, with common law in-
crementalism, with holdings in the alternative, with distinctions 
among prior cases and disavowals of earlier dicta, and with avoidance 
of ultimate questions. The decisions often articulate new standards, 
occasionally clashing with those of other jurisdictions. Like the stat-
utes, the Islamic case law evidences convergence with the secular 
law. 
A. Divorce and Polygamy: New Standards and Conflicts 
Consider first a talak case, decided by the Selangor Appeal Com-
mittee in 1991. As we have seen in Part One,328 the statute prohibits 
(indeed, it penalizes329) utterance of a talak out of court. Traditional 
Shafi'i doctrine, however, finds extrajudicial talak to be completely 
normal and effective for divorce.33o In this case, Zainab binti 
Mahmood and Abd. Latif bin JUSOh,331 there were no witnesses to 
the extrajudicial talak, except the wife, who denied it had been ut-
tered. Under customary Shafi'i doctrine, neither witnesses nor the 
wife's presence would be required. Consequently, the kadi held the 
repudiation to be effective. The appeal committee reversed, holding 
that the statute provides the exclusive way to register a talak divorce 
when the wife does not agree.332 That is, application must be made 
to the court, and the conciliation process must be followed. Moreover, 
said the Selangor Committee, the Qur'an ~equires that a talak be wit-
nessed by two adults of good character, failing which it is invalid.333 
The witnessing, the committee implied, must be done in the kadi's 
court. Talak remains the husband's right in Islam, but it may not be 
328. Supra at 274. 
329. Selan~:or Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984, No.4 of 1984, § 124. 
330. Nawawi, supra n. 193, at 327-44. 
331. Civil Appeal Case No. 16 of 1990 (Selangor App. Comm. 1991). 
332. Id., slip op. at 4. 
333. Id. at 6-7. 
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uttered arbitrarily. Accordingly, concluded the committee, there is 
no conflict between the statutory provision and the Qur'an~c ones.334 
Of course, it may be asked how talak can be 'the husband's right 
if the statutory ground in which the right is now subsumed requires a 
judicial finding of irretrievable breakdown.335 And if talak may not 
be uttered at the pleasure of the husband, why do the Shafi'i sources 
recite innumerable ways to utter a repudiation, including: "Go back 
to your family," "Go away," "Leave me alone," "Bid me good-bye," and 
the singularly expressive "Your rope is on your withers"?336 To be 
sure, the statute is clear enough in failing to countenance extrajudi-
cial repudiation or, for that matter, repudiation even in court without 
a finding of breakdown. But that merely makes the statute more 
problematic in Islamic terms, and it cannot be doubted that a good 
many kadis were....,-'-and are---registering divorces based on talaks ut-
tered long before the parties got to court. The Zainab decision was 
not popular among ulama. There is a clear doctrinal trend here, but 
it is not uncontested .. 
If Zainab was unpopular, Aishah bte. Abdul Rauf v. Wan Mohd. 
Yusof bin Wan Othman,337 decided by the same appeal committee a 
year earlier, produced a storm of protest in the Malay press.33S Wan 
Yusofwas a well-off businessman who applied for permission to take 
as his second wife a Malay film star, N oor Kumalasari. Aishah, his 
first wife, refused to concur and contested his application in the 
kadi's court outside Kuala Lumpur. Noting Wan Yusof's financial 
ability and finding him able to satisfy the emotional needs of both 
women, the kadi granted permission. Aishah appealed, and the com-
mittee reversed. 
On the question of financial ability, the appeal committeeac-
cepted the kadi's finding but cautioned ominously that in future ap-
plicants for polygamous marriages will need to provide documentary 
evidence, including income tax records.339 The committee then went 
on to hold that Wan Yusof had failed to prove that the second mar-
334. Id. at 9. 
335. Selangor Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984,.No. 4 of 1984, §§ 47-48. 
336. Nawawi, supra n. 193, at 327·44 .. 
337. [1990] 3 M.L.J. Ix (Selangor App. Comm. 1990). 
338. For small portions of the debate, see A. Nazri Abdullah, "Undang-undang 
Kekeluargaan Islam: Siapa yang Keliru? [Islamic Family Law: Who is Confused?]," 
Berita Minggu, Aug. 5, 1990, at 10; Khalid Mohd., "Sejauh manakah undang2 boleh 
halang poligami [How Far Can the Laws Change Polygamy?]," Mingguan Malaysia, 
Aug. 5, 1990, at 9; "Polygamy not a right enshrined in the Quran," New Straits Times, 
Aug. 20, 1990, at F·17. See also "Noorkumalasari Appeals to Trader's Wife," Star, 
Aug. 4, 1990, at 3. 
339. [1990] 3 M.L.J. at lxii. The reliance on documents for such purposes is not 
customary in Islamic law. See generally J.A. Wakin,The Function of Documents in 
Islamic Law (1972); Messick, "The Mufti, the Text and the World: LegalInterpreta· 
tion in Yemen," 21 Man (n.s.) 102, 114 (1986). 
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riage was "ju.st and necessary," as the statute requires.340 His stated 
inability to control his love for Noor Kumalasari would not make a 
second marriage just. And, added the committee, the bare statement 
by a husband that he intends to treat his first wife and existing chil-
dren fairly does not make it so. At the very least, witnesses must 
testify that the husband is a God-fearing and observant Muslim.341, 
The committee turned finally, but briefly, to the religious validity 
of the four polygamy conditions of the Selangor statute, which, as we 
have just seen, go beyond conventIonal Shafi'i doctrine. The commit-
tee held that they are not in conflict with the Qur'an. The Qur'an 
appears to permit up to four wives unless the husband fears that he 
will "not be able to deal justly with them . . . ."342 The statute does 
not aim "to abolish polygamy," said the committee, "but it merely pro-
vides constructive requirements in the hope that justice in the Mus-
lim family may be better achieved. "343 
Perhaps so, but, with an open-ended burden of proof about future 
conduct placed on the husband, it is difficult to imagine tha~ many 
applications for polygamous marriages will be approved if the first 
wife objects. It is said that the Sultan of Selangor was concerned 
about the legality of his own polygamous marriage after this decision, 
and the four remaining conditions came under serious scrutiny.344 
None of this was of more than passing concern to Wan Yusof. He 
and Noor Kumalasari traveled to the east coast state of Trengganu, 
there to be married by a kadi who did not inquire or did not care what 
the Selangor Appeal Committee had done.345 ' 
At the time of the marriage in Trengganu, that state's Family 
Law Enactment simply r~quired, in general terms, the permissiori of 
a Shariah court judge for a polygamous marriage.346 The Selangor 
standards, however, purport to apply to prospective polygamous hus-
bands who are resident in Selangor, even if they are to be married 
outside Selangor.347 The Trengganu act provides that marriages are 
generally to be solemnized in the mukim or area in which the bride 
resides, unless the kadi or Registrar of Marriages allows solemniza-
340. Selangor Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984, No.4 of 1984, § 23(3). 
341. [1990] 3 M.L.J. at lxiii. 
342. Sura An-Nissa', quoted in id. 
343. Id. 
344. I am drawing here on an interview with a prominent Islamic jurist, Kuala 
Lumpur, Apr. 27, 1992. The appeal committee was called in by the Sultan and asked 
to explain the decision; and the state mufti was asked to examine the legality of the 
four statutory conditions for polygamy. Id. 
345. It is not uncommon for husbands refused permission to take a second wife to 
leave the jurisdiction and marry her in another state or in southern Thailand. Raja 
Rohana, supra n. 161, at 65. 
346. Terengganu Administration ofIslamic Family Law Enactment 1985, No. 12 of 
1985, § 21. 
347. Selangor Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984, No.4 of 1984, § 23(2). 
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tion to take place elsewhere.348 If the woman resides in another 
state, the appropriate authority in the other state must first give per-
mission for the marriage,349 which manifestly Selangor did not do in 
Noor Kumalasari's case. Under Trengganu law, in short, ifthe bride 
had established Trengganu residence, all that would be required for 
the polygamous marriage would be the permission' of the Trengganu 
kadi. If she had not, the Selangor authorities would have had to be 
consulted. 
That is the law of Trengganu. But what about the law of Selan-
gor? What effect does the Selangor provision giving extraterritorial 
, application to its polygamy requirements have, when Selangor resi-
dents seek to be married outside the state? Suppose Aishah, the first 
wife, had managed to object to the Trengganu marriage on the basis 
of the refusal of permission in Selangor. Would the Trengganu kadi 
have been legally obliged to recognize the Selangor refusal? If Noor 
Kumalasari were not a Trengganu resident, as we have seen, the sec-
ond marriage would clearly be foreclosed under the Trengganu stat-
ute. But if Noor Kumalasari were a Trengganu resident, the answer 
is much less clear. The conventional answer in Islamic law is that 
each kadi must decide for himself, and so the Trengganu kadi may 
not have been obliged to recognize Selangor's refusal of permission, 
based on Selangor's more restrictive standards for polygamy. 
Why this is so may seem a bit mysterious. It may reflect a confu-
sion of the absence of an Islamic doctrine of precedent with the ab-
sence of a doctrine of recognition of judgments. Malaysia's Islamic 
system is superimposed on its federal system, and there is no doubt 
that one kadi will recognize the marital status of a party married or 
divorced in another jurisdiction. So, if no proceedings had taken 
place in Selangor and Wan Yusof had been married to a second wife 
in Trengganu on a showing insufficient to justify polygamy in Selan-
gor, Selangor courts would still recognize the marriage. Even now, 
they would presumably do so, though they refused permission before 
the marriage, when the issue was open to them.360 The usual con-
flict-of-Iaws principle is that a marriage valid where contracted will 
be recognized elsewhere unless it is contrary to the fundamental pub-
348. Terengganu Administration ofIslamic Family Law Enactment 1985, No. 12 of 
1985, § 18. ' 
349. Id., § 18(3)(b). If the husband-to-be is resident in a state other than Tereng-
ganu, the appropriate authority in that state would merely have to attest to the truth 
of the facts stated in the marriage application. Id. ' 
350. Indeed, the marriage can now be registered in Selangor. See Selangor Islamic 
Family Law Enactment 1984, No.4 of 1984 (as amended by Selangor Islamic Family 
Law (Amendment) Enactment 1988, No.6 of 1988, § 5), § 23(1): "No man, during the 
subsistence of a marriage shall, except with the prior permission in writing of the 
Syar'iah Judge, contract another marriage, but and subject to Section 123 if he mar-
ries without such permission such marriage may be registered under this Enactment 
on the order of the Court." Section 123 is the provision making polygamy without 
permission an offense. 
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lic policy of the state in which recognition is sought.351 But the same 
principle does not require recognition of one state's refusal to permit 
marriage, based on standards more restrictive than those that pre-
vail in the second state.352 Selangor's attempt to restrict the behav-
ior of its residents outside its borders will likely be ineffective if the 
parties meet the requirements laid down by another state, as Wan 
Yusof and Noor Kumalasari apparently did. 
The potential for confusion and interstate conflict exemplified by 
Aishah v.Wan Yusof suggests the urgent need to develop principles 
of Islamic conflict of laws that thus far do not exist. A draft bill on 
interstate enforcement of summonses, warrants, judgments, and or-
ders of Shariah courts has been prepared for enactment.353 It pro-
vides that a Shariah court order or judgment from one state may be 
registered in the Shariah court of another; from that point on it will 
be treated as if it had been issued by the receiving court.354 By far 
the most important problem to which such provisions are directed re-
lates to the recurrent failure of husbands and former husbands to 
comply with maintenance orders. On such problems, the act should 
have a beneficial impact. But where two states follow different stan-
dards in their Shariah law, tl1e underlying conflict-of-Iaws problems 
will not nec·essarily be resolved by interstate registration ofjudg-
ments and orders alone. In cases like Aishah, the more permissive 
state may not be bound by a decision of a more restrictive state if the 
kadi finds the restrictive sta~dards to be in excess of what Hukum 
Syara requires. For the most part, the rea~tion of reformers has been 
to decry the variation rather than search for principles of recognition 
and non-recognition of judgments in the light of Islamic rules about 
the prerogative of kadis. . 
Occasionally, informal means are found to prevent inteIjurisdic-
tional circumvention of judgments. In one Singapore case, a wife ig-
nored a judicial decree of reconciliation obtained by her husband and 
proceeded across the causeway to Johore to be married to a second 
man, only t'o find the Singapore kadi close behind; On proof of the 
351. See, e.g., In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953). 
352. Thus, restrictions on marriage to first cousins, very common in states of the 
United States, do not bind those states that permit 'such mlil'liages. And marriages 
between first cousins in the less restrictive states will be recognized as valid in the 
couple's home state even if they went to the less restrictive state solely to take advan-
tage onts more liberal marriage law and returned home immediately thereafter. 
Schofield v.Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. 564 (1912). But compare id, at 570 (an expressed 
personal incapllcity imposed by legislation will be respected regardless of where mar-
riage is contracted) (dictum) with Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1933). See 
Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws § 5.lA (3d ed. 1986). 
353. Sabah Syariah .Courts (Enforcement of Summonses, Warrants, Judgements 
and Orders) Bill 1992, Legislative Assembly Bill No: 0 of 1992. Although the Sabah 
version is cited, this unenacted bill is likely to be. enacted by t~e federal parliament 
rather than a Iltate legislature. 
354. Id., § 4(1). 
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reconciliation, the Johore kadi annulled the second marriage he had 
performed.355 Such piecemeal methods do not satisfy the conflict-of-
law impulses of Malaysia's Islamic law reformers, who itch for a 
means of securing uniform laws and uniform application of them. 
Denial of permission for polygamy has not been uncommon in Selan-
gor; it appears to be quite uncommon in Trengganu. As things now 
stand, alternative models in famiiy law allow forum shopping. 
A vexing problem under Shafi'i doctrine that is slowly being re-
solved by judicial decision is the matter of talak tiga (three talaks). 
Only a talak thrice uttered is irrevocable; indeed, it terminates main-
tenance payments to the divorced wife and precludes remarriage to 
her unless another consummated marriage intervenes. But what if a 
husband utters three talaks at once? Nearly all the Arab countries 
and most other Islamic jurisdictions provide that a simultaneous 
triple talak counts only as one and so is revocable.356 The Shafi'i 
school, however, counts it as three,357 much to the chagrin ofIslamic· 
reformers among the Shafi'i Malays. 
Slowly, judicial decisions seem to be eroding the firmness of this 
rule. Where the husband was found to belong to the Hanafi school, 
presumably because he was an Indian Muslim, three talaks were 
held to equal one.358 Where a husband had previously uttered one 
talak and then simultaneously uttered two more, the Federal Terri-
tory Appeal Board reversed a kadi's determination of irrevocable di-
vorce and found as a matter of fact that the husband had only meant 
to utter the second talak.359 Where the husband could not recall the 
date of the alleged talak tiga, and the wife denied he had uttered it, 
th~ same appeal board, expressing obvious displeasure with the ease 
with which the kadi had confirmed the irrevocable divorce, remanded 
the case for a hearing. ~60 The wife's denial puts the burden of proof 
355. Djamour, supra n. 126, at 127-28. 
356. Anderson, supra n. 209, at 227; Siraj, supra n. 276, at 229. 
357. Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 248, at xv (overview of talak tiga issue in Shafi'i 
thought). 
358. Re Mohd. Hussin bin Abdul Ghani & Anor, [1990] 2 M.L.J. lxxv (Fed. Terr. 
Syariah App. Bd. 1990). The board applied Hanafi doctrine because of the identity of 
the parties. See infra n. 364. ." 
359. Jasni bin Adbul Rahim v. Rahmah" bte. Mohd. Jono, [1992] 1 M.L.J. cxliii 
(Fed. Terr. Syariah App. Bd. 1991). The Board applied Hanafi doctrine because of the 
identity of the parties. See infra n. 364. 
360. Rojmah bte. Adbul Kadir v. Mohsin bin Ahmad, [1991] 3 M.L.J. xxx (Fed. 
Terr. App. Bd. 1991). The board's hostility to the simultaneous triple talak is trans-
parent. It stated flatly that "a person who wishes to divorce his wife should pro-
nounce one talaq at a time," id. at xxxii. Upon pronouncement of irrevocable divorce, 
the husband is generally liable to pay the balance of the bride price as well as a con-
solatory gift and the wife's share of jointly-held property. One payment to which the 
wife is not entitled if the divorce is irrevocable is maintenance during the eddah pe-
riod, which lasts for 100 days after the pronouncement of a talak. This is likely an 
additional reason for the reluctance of appeal boards to confirm divorce in talak tiga 
cases. 
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on the husband, who must produce witnesses.36l Noting that the act 
provides only for talak in court, the board went on to point out that 
talaks are pronounced in court only one at a time.362 If that is so-
and it surely is-then the talak tiga problem dissolves. Extrajudicial 
talaks are invalid, and so are multiple, simultaneous talaks. Rather 
than go this route, however, the board simply determined that a kadi 
must take great care in evaluating a pronouncement of three talaks. 
Had the Federal Territory Appeal Board taken the logic of the 
Selangor Appeal Committee in Zainab to the next step and ~eter­
mined that, Bince extrajudicial talaks are invalid, there can nev~r be 
three talaks at once, a6a the dissonance with Malaysian Islam would 
have been enormous. This reading of the statute, however, would 
have been wlassailable. 
By the same token, the Federal Territory model implicitly pro-
vides for recourse for· some purposes to any of the Sunni schools, a64 
and we have. seen that the statute itself borrows from other 
schools.a6G So in principle the board could have chosen the non-
Shafi'i rule that three talaks simultaneously pronounced amount 
only to one. This it has never done unless the husband belongs to 
another school. It has justified this practice by reference to a leaciing 
Shafi'i text that makes t}:le choice of school turn on the husband's af-
filiation.a66 Yet this is a Shafi'i choice oflaw rule that the statute 
neither requires nor forbids. Anc~ so, for the time being, decisions are 
burdened with what may seem. to be logical inc~nsistencies. But 
talak tiga is having a hard~r imd harder time in court.a67 By a com-
mon law process, it is being whittled away. 
361. Id. at xxxii. 
362. Id. at xxxi. The board pointedly asked "whether any action had been taken" 
against the hunband for Violating the act by pronouncing talak out of court. Id. at 
xxxii. . 
363. Zainab 'V. Abd. Latif, supra n. 331, slip op. at 4-5. The statute never speaks of 
simultaneously pronouncing three talaks; in-court talaks are pronounced !,ingly. See, 
e.g., Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, §§ 47(3), 47(14), 
48(5). Twice the Federal Territory Appeal Board has come close, saying that there 
seems to be nothing in the statute allowing for registration of divorces pronounced 
outside of court, Re Mohd, Hussin, supra n. 358, at lxxv; Rojmah, supra n. 360, at 
xxxi, but in each case it has decided the matter on other grounds. 
364. Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 2(1): 
" 'Hukum Syara' means the laws of Islam in any recognized sects .... " This broad 
definition is not necessarily a blanket authorization to choose rules freely from among 
the various schools, for the term Hukum Syara' appears at various specific points in 
the statute and requires definition in those contexts: See, e.g., id., §§ 52(1)(l) (fasakh 
grounds), 60 (liability for maintenance). But it was pursuant to section 2(1) that the 
board in Re Mohd. Hussin, supra n. 358, at lxxvi, stated it was "justified" in looking to 
Hanafi rules, thus implying that section 2(1) might provide fairly wide-ranging au-
thorization for the choice of any appropriate rule in the course of litigation. 
365. See supra at 269,281-82,287. 
366. Re Mohd. Hussin, supra n. 358, quoting Nawawi, supra n. 193, at 337-38. 
367. In addition to the cases discussed, see Mohaygen A. Naing, supra n. 160, at 
142-43. . 
552 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 42 
In all of these cases, and inevitably in all statutory formulations 
of revealed law, there is dual-track reasoning. The statute is inter-
preted, and then it is demonstrated that the statute, so interpreted, 
accords with the proper Islamic view of the matter. (Or, in the Fed-
eral Territory talak tiga case, the appeal board concedes that, since 
the statute does not provide for extrajudicial talak, initial "recourse 
must be had to the [nonstatutory] sources of Islamic law."368 Either 
way, there is in principle no power to vary Islamic law.) It is hardly 
surprising that the statute, which is drafted to read like any statute 
in the secular law, will be interpreted by methods familiar to Malay-
sia's common law judges. What is less evident until one focuses on it 
is that the Islamic sources are interpreted bY,the very same methods. 
An excellent example is provided by the judgment of the appeal 
committee in Aishah v. Wcin Yusof,369 the polygamy case. There is a 
verse in the Qur'an that reads "If you fear that you shall not be able 
to deal justly with orphans, marry women of your choice-two, three, 
or four. But if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with 
them, then marry one. That will be more suitable to prevent you 
from doing injustice. "370 This is the verse widely thought to author-
ize polygamy on a liberal basis. In dealing with it, the committee 
noted that "the first limb" of the passage is permissive, the second 
prohibitive.371 It then proceeded to say that both limbs must coexist, 
and since the statute does not abolish polygamy but purports merely 
to insure justice to wives, it is not incompatible with the restrictive . 
verse.372 
Wan Yusofhad also contended, and the kadi had agreed, that a 
good reason for granting permission for the second marriage was that 
otherwise the sin of adultery might result. Construing the statute, 
the appeal committee held that this could not justify the permission. 
Wan Yusof must be "in control of his desires and be able to restrain 
himselffrom committing adultery and other sinful deeds,"373 particu-
larly inasmuch as "Aishah has no physical defects and has adequate 
sexual feelings and has never objected to sexual relations. "374 But 
then the committee had to confront the kadi's Islamic grounds for 
368. Re Mohd. Hussin, supra n. 358, at lxxv. The board also notes that the statute 
makes it an offense to pronounce extrlijudicial talak-which it concedes is allowed in 
Islam-but states that the offense "appears to be ignored so far by the Syariah 
Court." Id. To complete the paradox, the board hints in Rojmah, supra n. 360, at 
xxxii, that on remand the kadi's court ought to think about punishing the husband for 
the offense of pronouncing talak out of court. All of this while still enforcing-reluc-
tantly-extrlijudicial talak. 
369. Supra n. 337. 
370. Quoted in id. at lxiii. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. at lxii. 
374. Id. at lxiii. 
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permission, which depend on a hadith (an authoritative saying of the 
Prophet). Here is how the committee dealt with the problem: 
The learned judge relies on the legal ruling which states 
that a person is obliged to marry if he is able to fulfil the 
sexual needs of the wife and he fears that he will be drawn to 
commit zina [the sin of fornication] or some wrong and he is 
also able to provide maintenance for the wife. In our opinion 
this ruling is addressed specifically to young men who are 
unmarried, and it is based on the hadith as told by Abdullah 
bin Masod, which is to the effect: . 
Oh young people whoever among you is able to 
marry should marry for it keeps you from looking at 
strange women and preserves from unlawful inter-
course. (Sunan Abu Dawud Kitab Al Nikah Vol 2 p. 
544). . 
If the unmarried young men are capable of doing so, that is 
both physically and materially, they should marry because if 
they do not so they may be tempted to commit zina or sinful 
act[s]. Therefore, the hadith relied upon by the learned 
judge of the Syariah Court is wholly irrelevant on the facts of 
the present case.375 . 
In short, concluded the appeal committee, the hadith applies only to 
first marrial~es. 
The committee gave the hadith the same treatment it might 
have given to a prior decision: it distinguished it. The judgment 
manifests the usual common law antipathy to deduction and abstract 
principles, and its affinity for context or what Karl N. Llewellyn 
called "situation sense. "376 The technique of the appeal committee 
raises no eyebrows in the common law world, but it is not the usual 
Islamic exegesis, which, many commentators have pointed out, is un-
usually deductive and, when creative, mainly analogical. 377 
Two more recent Selangor cases are even more thoroughly suf-
fused with common law method. In Fakhariah bte. Lokman v. Johari 
bin Zakaria,378 a husband and wife had remarried after their first 
divorce. The husband had duly executed a taklik, a statement prom-
ising that if he failed to maintain the wife for four months, "according 
to the custom, "379 the wife could secure a divorce. After a quarrel, the 
375. Id. at lxiii. 
376. The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals passim (1960). 
377. For depictions of classical Islamic legal reasoning, see Wael B. Hallaq, "Legal 
Reasoning in Islamic Law and the Common Law: Logic and Method," 34 Clev. St. L. 
Rev. 79 (1985·86); Messick, supra n. 339, at 112-16; Rosen, "Islamic 'Case Law' and 
the Logic of Consequence," in History and Power in the Study of Law, supra n. 23, at 
302-19. 
378. [1993] 1 M.L.J. lxxvii (Selangor Syariah App. Bd. 1992). 
379. Id. at lxxviii. 
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wife left the marital home and thereafter received no maintenance. A 
year and a half later, she sued for divorce based on the taklik. Fol-
lowing standard doctrine, the kadi held that the wife's right to main-
tenance was conditioned on her obedience. When she left home 
without her husband's permission, she exhibited recalcitrance 
(nusyuz), which precluded maintenance and the award of a divorce 
based on a failure to provide it. Reversing the kadi and neglecting 
the language in the taklik about "custom," the Selangor Appeal 
Board decided that, as the taklik was framed in unconditional terms, 
recalcitrance is no defense. In any case, said the board, if there is a 
doubt about the terms of a taklik, the document should be construed 
against the husband.3Bo If the importation of this common lawprin-
ciple of construction were not enough, the board went on to distin-
guish an earlier case in which a kadi had held that a taklik that is 
silent on the wife's duty of obedience cannot override that duty, 
which derives from divine law.38l In that case, the kadi had found 
the wife to have been obedient, and so the point was not squarely 
decided. But even if it were, concluded the appeal board in an explic-
itly' alternative holding, Fakhariah's husband had never obtained a 
judicial order of recalcitrance against her and so is disabled from 
raising the matter as a defense to the divorce action.382 
ThePakhariah judgment was written by Tan Sri Haji Mohamed 
Azmi, a secular court judge who also delivered the judgment in Nory-
ati bte. Tasrip v. Ha'mid bin ehe Mat,383 iIi which a husband 'had, 
sued to confirm an order of marital reconciliation (rujuk). To be effec-
tive to revoke a divorce, such a reconciliation would have to have 
been accomplished within the lOO-day eddah period during which 
certain divorces are still revocable. Hamid, however, had stated two 
different dates in his documentation, one of them beyond the eddah 
period. Accordingly, the Registrar of Muslim Marriages had deciined; 
to register the rujuk, whereupon Hamid managed to persuade the' 
kadi's court to declare the rujuk valid. On appeal, the kadi was re- . 
versed. Where the wife denies that rujuk took place within the ap-
propriate period, the burden falls on the husband, to produce two 
witnesses to the rujuk. No such witnesses were produced, and the 
rujuk is thus not registrable. An earlier case384 was distinguished on 
the ground that there the wife did not contest the validity' of the 
rujuk, rendering earlier statements of the board dispensing with the 
380. Id. at lxxix. 
381. Aisny bte. Mohamed Davis v. Haji Fahro Rozi bin Mohdi, [1990] 2 M.L.J. xXvi 
(Fed. Terr. Syariah App. Comm. 1989). ' 
382. Fakhariah, supra n. 378, at lxxix~lx. ' 
383. [1993] 1 M.L.J. cxxxiX (Selangor Syariah App. Bd. 1992). 
384. Siti Hawa bte. Mohamed v. Mohamed Redzuan, [1992] 1 M.L.J. cxcix (Selan-
gor Syariah App. Bd. 1990). 
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need for witnesses obiter-fortunately so, since the Qur'an provides 
that witnesses are needed.385 
Qur'anic interpretation is here mixed with common law doctrine 
and method. The interpretation of documents, the use and avoidance 
of precedent, the resort to alternative holdings, the invocation of bur-
den of proof: all proceed according to common law practice, which 
shapes the outcome. In Fakhariah, the wife's production of male and 
female witnesses is held to be sufficient on a plain reading of the stat-
ute. In Noryati, the husband's failure to produce any witnesses 
defeats his case, on burden of proof grounds. In the former, the effect 
of eliminating a recalcitrance defense to-a taklik divorce is to put Se-
langor in conflict with other states and to weaken the wife's tradi-
tional duty to obey her husband, a duty which has long made it 
legally perilous for a wife to leave an unhappy marital home.38G In 
the latter case, the effect might be.to spread the seeds of an emerging 
doctrine that no reconciliation will be held effective merely because 
the husband unilaterally pronounces it.387 The core substantive doc-
trines expounded by common law method are thoroughly Islamic in 
origin, but it is a decidedly progressive, reshaped version that 
emerges from the hand of the judges. 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, as we have seen, Islamic 
law has been subjected to the mercies of common law judges, at first 
~ritish and now Malay. The incremental movement to a new law is 
methodologically familiar, even when the Islamic sources are not. 
The Shariah in Malaysia is thus doubly affected by the common law. 
In the first place, it is surrounded by a much larger body of British-
derived secular principles, some of which, insofar as they apply to 
non-Muslims, cover the same fields as those which apply to Muslims. 
This is the case with family law. There has been a discernible ten-
dency to reduce the dissonance between the two bodies oflaw, both by 
legislation and by judicial decision. In the second place, the galloping 
codification of Islamic law beginning in the 1980s has placed a large 
385. Noryati, supra n. 383, at cxli-cxlii. 
386. In some states, nusyuz is a common defense to a taklik action. Sharifah 
Zaleha, supra n. 241, at 192-93; Sharifah Zaleha, supra n. 195, at 6-7, 11. 
387. The appeal board in Noryati, supra n. 382, at cxliii, stated that "[i]n any case, 
as the wife has not consented to the ruju', the court has no authority to order the 
registrar to register it." What the board seemed to be referring to is the requirement, 
in the Federal rrerritory and Kelantan models, that a wife may not be ordered to re-
sume relations after a rujuk to which she has not consented. Islamic Family Law 
(Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 51(9); Kelantan Islamic Family Law 
Enactment 1983, No.1 of 1983, § 39(4)(b). Under these sections, her failure to con-
sent triggers appointment of the same sort of conciliatory committee appointed in 
cases of divorce by reason of irretrievable breakdown. If the conciliatory proceedings 
lead to stalemate, the arbitrators appointed may ultimately 4;lffect a divorce. By impli-
cation, then, for a rujuk to be valid a wife must consent. With the abolition of unilat-
eral pronouncements of divorce, it stands to reason that unilateral pronouncements of 
reconciliation will come under scrutiny. In various ways, the family law enactments 
penalize unilateral rujuk. See supra n. 216. 
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number of relatively more specific statutory provisions before the Is-
lamic courts for interpretation. It stands to reason that, in interpret-
ing statutes and Islamic sources simultaneously, the same 
interpretive method might be applied to both-which is exactly what 
has happened, at least in some appeal committees. In the end, this 
common law transformation may be the latent meaning of "upgrad-
ing" the 8hariah courts. ' 
B. Marital Property and Consolatory Gilts: Changing Law, 
Changing System 
Upon divorce, a Muslim woman in Malaysia is entitled to several 
forms of payment.388 These include any unpaid portion of the mas 
kahwin or dowry and other gifts promised to the wife at the time of 
marriage, full payment of which is often deferred; maintenance and 
accommodation for the period of 100 days following a revocable di-
vorce, at which point it becomes irrevocable and the wife receives no 
further maintenance; the wife's share of the harta sepencarian or 
joiritly ~cquired marital property; and mutfJ,'ah, a required consola-
tory gift payable to a wife who has been divorced without fault. 
If the divorce is by mutual consent, the parties may agree on the 
amounts due. 80metim~s, to induce. ~onsent, the wife waives pay-
ment of some or all of these obligations. In practice, whether by 
agreement or default, the husband often pays little or no mainte-
nance or muta'ah. In a large urban survey from the 1970s, more than 
a third paid no maintenance, and 90 percent paid no muta'ah.389 
When it was paid, muta'ah formerly consisted of only a' token 
amount, perhaps as low as M$1O (approximately U.8.$4) and rarely 
more than M$100.390 These practices, however, are beginning to 
change, as kadis and lawyers become more diligent about enforce~ 
ment and as the legal obligations themselves expand. 
The formal outlines of the obligations appear timeless, but their 
scope and content have been growing. This is particularly true. of 
harta sepencarian and of qluta'ah. The role of economic change, of 
the 8hariah bar, of judges, and of statutes and practices (both Islamic 
and secular) in bringing about the reconfiguration oflegal obligations 
provides important clues to the various combinations of elements 
that produce systemic legal change. 
388. For a survey, see Supiah Meon, "Financial Provisions: Maintenance and 
Property-The Law Applicable to Muslims," in Women and the Law, supra n. 210, at 
24-36. See also Abdul'Kadir bin Yusof, "Women and the Law," [1975] 2 M.L.J. xxi 
(before the family law enactments codified the obligations); Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 
248, at xvi-xvii (Singapore law, which is generally similar). 
389. Azizah, supra n. 243, at 99-101, 102-03. 
390. See id. at 103; Djamour, supra n. 126, at 111, 162 (Singapore practice from 
1960s); Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 248, at xvii (same). 
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1. Marital Property: Merging and Emerging Law 
Harta seJPencarian is an institution of marital property. The his-
torical core of the institution holds that property (usually land) ac-
quired or improved during marriage by means of the Joint resources 
or joint labor of husband and wife belongs to both of them and will be 
divided into Bhares upon divorce or death.391 The woman's share in 
such property, titled in her husband's name, has been variable over 
time and place, but generally it has been put at one-half, one-third, or 
a fraction dir,ectly proportionate to her contribution.392 Although fre-
quently confused with the Islamic concept of harta sharikat or part-
nership,393 harta sepencarian derives instead from pre-Islamic Malay 
adat or custom.394 It'may have roots in the matrilineal society of 
Negeri Sembilan,395 aspects of which have affected custom in other 
states,396 although similar marital property rules can be found 
among non-matrilineal Muslim groups elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 
The doctrine of harta sepencarian has the potential, at several 
points, to conflict with Islamic rules.397 The Sunni law of intestate 
succession, in effect in Malaysia, allocates, to a widow a one-eighth 
share if there are surviving children, one,.quarterifnot.398 The maxi-
mum share is less than what the wife will probably receive on harta 
sepencarian property at her husband's death.399 If this conflict is 
usually averted, that is only because amica,ble agreement among rel~ 
atives accords the widow a share larger than Islamic law does.40o 
391. See Hj. Salleh bin Hj. Buang, New Frontiers in Harta Sepencarian 5-9 (1988). 
Sometimes joint efforts were not required. Id. at 10-12. 
392. Id. at 17, 21, 38-39, 41. 
393. Id. at 10, 44; Hooker, supra n. 107, at 240-48. 
,394. Zainoon v. Mohamed Zain, [1981] 2 M.L.J. 111 (Singapore Shariah App. Bd. 
1978); Abdul Msjid Nabi Baksh, Muslim Divorce: Ancillary Orders 34-37 (unpub-
lished manuscript, n.d., ca. 1992). 
395. Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Muslims in Malaysia and Singapore: The Law of Mari-
tal Property," in Family Law in Asia and Africa, supra n. 209, at 195 (reporting that 
the rule beiongsl to the matrilineal adat). 
396. Taylor, !Iupra n. 106, at 8-9 (noting that traces of matrilineal adat were visible 
in south Perak property distributions). 
397. Many authorities state that Islam recognizes only separate property, even 
during marriage. See Mustafa O. Abubaker, Properly Rights DUring Marriage and 
Divorce 91 (1980); M.B. Hooker, The Personal Laws of Malaysia 21 (1976); David 
Pearl, A Textbook on Muslim Personal Law 75 (2d ed. 1987). 
398. Susan M. Redick, Islamic Law of Succession and Its Application in Malaysia 
and Singapore 17 (unpublished paper, Duke Law Sc~ool, Spring 1993). 
399. Under Sunni rules enforced in Malaysia, a male spouse also inherits twice 
what a female spouse inherits, Abdul Kadir, supra n. 388, at xxv, whereas harta 
sepencarian often provides for equal division of marital property on the death of 
either. Once the harta sepencarian share has been severed, the spouse is also eligible 
to inherit the appropriate share of the remaining estate. See Mehrun Siraj, supra n. 
126, at 45. In practice, however, it remains an open question how frequently such 
double division occurs. See infra n. 400 and accompanying text. 
400. Ahmad Ibrahim, Family Law in Malaysia and Singapore 294-95 (2d ed. 1984) 
("The fact that the Muslim law allows distribution of the estate of a deceased person 
to be settled by consent of the heirs has enabled many arrangements which are in 
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Of course, a conflict between Islamic law and harta sepencarian 
depends on a prior finding that the wife's share is actually part of the 
husband's estate-which, however, is the very thing in issue-and 
there are ways to conclude that it is not. One way is to treat the 
wife's share as a debt to be deducted from the estate before it is sub-
ject to distribution.401 Such treatments become more difficult as the 
concept of marital property expands. Some cases hold that the wife's 
entitlement may accrue wholly as the result of doing housework 
while the husband acquired property in his name out of his own re-
sources402 or as the result of simply accompanying the husband on 
business tripS.403 Neither of these activities would give the wife any 
property interest under Islamic law.404 
Despite such conundrums, harta sepencarian has survived and 
expanded. The property concerned is not restricted· to land but ex-
tends to movable property-in one case, boats and fishing nets.405 As 
recently as the 1970s, it was plausible to think that in some states a 
claim to a share of marital property had to rest on equal capital or 
labor in its acquisition.406 Although shares are still variable by state 
and somewhat unpredictable by court, an equal contribution of labor 
or capital is generally not required to obtain a share. As already 
noted, housework that leaves a husband free to acquire property may 
be sufficient,407 and so is a wife's "constant companionship [that] was 
responsible for the [husband's] peace of mind which enabled him to 
function effectively as a businessman. "408 To be sure, a direct contri-
reality 'application of the adat kampong [village custom] to pass as distributions ac-
cording to Islamic law."); Taylor, supra n. 106, at 10 ("The fact that the Muhammadan 
law allows distribution of the estates of deceased persons to be settled by consent of 
the heirs has enabled many arrangements which were in reality application of kam-
pong custom to pass as distributions according to Muhammadan law .... "). In litiga-
tion, the problem is not so easily solved. See Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 395, at 195-96 
(discussing cases in which Quranic distributions superseded harta sepencarian and 
vice versa). 
401. Hj. Salleh, supra n. 391, at 33-34. 
402. Rokiah bte. Haji Abdul Jalil v. Mohamed Idris bin Shamsudin, [1989] 3 M.L.J. 
ix (Fed. Terr. App. Bd. 1989). 
403. Boto' binti Taha v. Jaafar bin Muhamed, [1985] 2 M.L.J. 98 (High Ct. 1983). 
404. Cf. Mannan, supra n. 168, at 59 (presumption that cash and household furni-
ture belong to husband); Takuma Abe, A Comparative Study of Islamic Ownership 
34-37 (Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, International University of Japan, Work-
ing Paper No. 10, 1987) (labor as basis of ownership); Ahmed H. Al-Maamiry, Eco-
nomics in Islam 54-57, 83 (1987) (various methods of acquiring ownership); 
Muhammad Muslehuddin, Economics and Islam 99 (1974) (same); Anwar Ahmad 
Qadri, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World 171-80 (1963) (same); Joseph 
Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law 136-38 (1964) (same). 
405. Boto', supra n. 403. 
406. See Ahmad Ibrahim, Islamic Law in Kelantan-197B, [1980] 2 M.L.J. xxxiii, 
xxxiv (remarking that this is a difficult standard). See also Ahmad Ibrahim, Family 
Law in Malaysia and Singapore 253· (2d ed. 1984) (recounting older cases in which 
household work entitles wife to no share). . 
407. Rokiah, supra n. 402. 
408.. Boto', supra n. 403, at 100. 
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bution, such as cultivation ofland, would generally entitle a wife to a 
larger share, typically one-half, but if the wife contributes "indirectly" 
(as in the case of business trips), she might receive a one-third share; 
indeed, she is "automatically entitled" to it.409 
However dubious as a matter of Islamic law, the intangible con-
tribution as a basis for a share is now well established. In Mansjur 
bin Abdul Rahman v. Kamariah bte. Noordin,410 a divorced wife 
sought a share in property her husband had been able to acquire only 
because she was a citizen, which he was not. Referring to the Islamic 
principle of musha, which mandates the equal division of separately 
owned property that has become commingled, the Federal Territory 
Appeal Board, concerned to ground harta sepencarian in Islamic 
law,411 remarked that "it seems justifiable to extend the principle to 
cases of claims to harla sepencarian. "412 Partly because the property 
could only have been obtained because of the wife's citizenship, the 
board confirmed the kadi's award of a half share to her in Mansjur. 
Even social position can constitute a contribution. In Tengku Anun 
Zaharah v. I,>ato'Dr. Hussein,413 the wife, a member of the Pahang 
royal family, had helped her commoner hu.sband obtain a state title 
and made it easier for him to do business. The husband had given 
her substantial sums of money to finance her business at one of the 
properties he acquired. Still, her claim to a share of property he ac~ 
quired, based on her indirect contribution, was upheld.414 Neither 
labor nor capital is now required. . 
Harta sepencarian cases now fall witliin the jurisdiction of the 
Shariah courts, and the f~mily law enactments empower the court in 
divorce cases to order "division between the parties of any assets ac-
quired by them dUring the marriage by their joint efforts."415 Previ-
ously, many stich claims came to the secul~r courts, and many of the 
expansive judgments were written by secular judges.416 The liberal 
409. Id. at 101. But see Zainuddin v. Anita, 4 J.H. 73 (Fed. Terr. App. Bd. 1982) 
(rights due to unequal contributions depend on mutual consent of the parties). 
410. [1988] 3 M.L.J. xlix (Fed. Terr. App. Bd. 1988). . 
411. Id. at xl ("[T]he Shariah Court and the 130ard of Appeal in their endeavour to 
apply the Islamic law must attempt to find support for the rule of harta sepencarian 
in Islamic jurisprudence."). 
412. Id. at li. 
413. 3 J.H. 125 (Selangor Chief Kadi's Court 1980). 
414. But only as to one of several plots ofland. 
415. Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 58(1). For 
jurisdiction to lodge in the Shariah court, it must, of course, be determined that the 
assets in disput.e are harta sepencarian assets. If not, the secular courts may still 
have jurisdiction. Noor Jahan v. Md. Yusoff, [1994] 1 M.L.J. 156, 161-63 (High Ct. 
1993). . 
'416. Boto', supra n. 403; Mohamed v. Commissioner of Lands and Mines Tereng-
ganu, [1968] 1 M.L.J. 227 (High Ct. 1968); Roberts alias Kamarulzaman v. Ummi 
Kalthom, [1966] 1 M.L.J. 163 (High Ct. 1966). But see Noor Jahan v. Md. Yusoff, 
supra n. 415, at 163 (enunciating the narrower, earlier doctrine, albeit on facts proba-
bly insufficient to create a harta sepencarian claim under current doctrine). 
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doctrines of these judges have been embraced and even extended by 
the Shariah courts. In some other areas of custom, Islamic revival-
ists have attempted to purify Malay practice of excrescences deriving 
from adat or from non-Islamic foreign influences: the worship of ker-
amats, places or persons with supernatural powers, is a good exam-
ple. But, in marital property, appellate bodies have crafted 
expansive doctrine while attempting to fuse harta sepencarian to Is-
lamic sources. 
Mansjur is the epitome of this syncretic effort, replete as it is 
with citations to Islamic textbooks, hadiths, and Malaysian state 
fatwas (legal rulings issued by a mufti or a committee of ulama), as 
well as to prior cases based on adat practice. In Mansjur, the appeal 
board takes the very different Islamic principle of musha-a princi-
ple of separate property that actually seems irrelevant to the adat 
concept of joint marital property-and uses it to create a property 
interest deriving from a contribution based on neither labor nor capi-
tal but on marital status.417 The fusion of Islamic sources, adat prac-
tices, and common law methods is striking. 
Since the family law enactments came into effect, such interpre-
tive acts are performed in the shadow of the statute. When the stat-
utes are examined, another powerful foreign element is added to the 
mix. The Federal Territory provisions on marital property are lifted 
directly from the secular provisions and indirectly from the English 
statutory law. 
Here, as on some other matters, Kelantan and Perak enacted 
provisions significantly different from those of the Federal Territory 
model followed by all other states. The Kelantan-Perak provisions 
authorize the court, at the time of divorce, to divide property acquired 
by husband and wife "during the marriage by their joint efforts" and 
also to divide the proceeds of sale of such property.418 The result of 
the division need not be a foreordained percentage but is merely to be 
"reasonable." In calculating the shares, the two statutes say, courts 
should take account of (1) the contributions of each party in money, 
property, or labor toward the acquisition of the asset, (2) any debts 
incurred by either party for their joint benefit, and (3) the needs of 
minor children, if any.419 These two states define harta sepencarian 
narrowly to include assets acquired jointly by the exercise of "efforts 
and capital contributed by each party."420 Construed strictly, the 
statutes would foreclose the award of a share based solely on indirect 
417. Mansjur, supra n. 410, at I-Iii. 
418. Kelantan Islamic Family Law Enactment 1983, No.1 of 1983, § 46(1); Perak 
Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984, No. 13 of 1984, § 54(1). 
419. Kelantan Islamic Family Law Enactment 1983, No.1 of 1983, § 46(2); Perak 
Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984, No. 13 of 1984, § 54(2). 
420. Id. 
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contribution, the sort of contribution recognized in Mansjur, Tengku 
Anun Zaharah, and other cases.421 , 
The Federal Territory model, adopted in every state other than 
Kelantan and Perak, contains the same basic provisions regarding 
division of property acquired by joint efforts during the marriage, ex-
cept that, subject to the same three considerations to be taken into 
account in arriving at a division, "the Court shall incline towards 
equality of division."422 The Federal Territory and all the states fol-
lowing it then add further subsections missing in the Kelantan and 
Perak statutes. These deal squarely with the indirect or constructive 
contribution of a spouse, as they ,reaffirm the right of one party to a 
marriage to a share of assets acquired through the sole effort or capi-
tal of the other.423 In dividing such assets, the statutes provide, the 
court should consider "the extent of the contributions made by the 
party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by 
looking after the home or caring for the fa.mily . . ." as well as the 
needs of minor children; subject to these considerations, the division 
should be "reasonable, but in any case the party by whose efforts the 
assets were acquired shall receive a greater proportion. "424 
Now, of course, this language does not, by itself, authorize a 
share based on citizenship status, accompaniment on business trips, 
or membership in an influential royal family, but these are modest 
interpretive extensions of the provisions, whereas they are a much 
greater stretch from the Kelantan-Perak provisions. Conceivably, bi-
furcated doctrine may emerge among the states. Before the statute 
was enacted, Kelantan courts occasionally had a narrower view of 
contributionB eligible for a harta sepencarian share;425 
The main source of the expansive Federal Territory provisions 
does not lie in the liberal harta sepencarian cases but-interestingly 
enough~in the statutory provisions applicable to non-Muslims. The 
Federal Territory provisions on marital assets are all virtually identi-
cal to those of the secular Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 
1976,426 from which they were obviously lifted wholesale. The bor-
rowed secular provisions are enforced in courts sitting solely to decide 
421. See supra nn. 402, 403, 410, 413. 
422. Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 58(1). 
Among states following the Federal Territory model, only Pahang provides for "such 
division as is reasonable," rather than inclining toward equal division. Pahang Is-
lamic Family Law Enactment 1987, No.3 of 1987, § 59(2). 
423. Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 58(3). 
424. Id., § 58(4). This looks as if a two-to-one ratio were contemplated, as in some 
of the cases allocating one-third for indirect contribution. 
425. See Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 406. 
426. Act 164, 1976, § 76. Section 76 is nearly verbatim with section 58 of the Is-
lamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, down to the matters to 
be taken into account in deciding on division, the inclination to equal or reasonable 
shares (and shllres weighted by contribution), as well as the definition of "assets ac-
quired during n marriage." 
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cases under Islamic law. Here, then, is a direct legal transplant from 
one sector of a legal system to another purporting to be animated by 
different and to some extent unalterable principles. 
There is also a striking similarity of judicial doctrine on the secu-
lar and Islamic sides. Adultery of a spouse does not preclude a claim 
for division of marital assets under the secular law,427 and neither 
does it defeat a claim to harta sepencarian.428 Some authors suggest 
that this rule confirms definitively that haria sepencarian is founded 
on adat rather than on Islam, since adultery would preclude claims 
founded on Islamic law, to maintenance,429 for example, or to harta 
sharikat.430 (This, however, is an argument that proves too much, 
since rules incompatible with Islam ought not to find legal recogni-
tion, and the Islamic disapproval of adultery is unequivocal.) Judi-
cial recognition of the companionship contribution of a spouse who 
advanced neither capital nor labor to acquire the property is also ex-
actly the same as the recognition accorded to such a contribution in 
English law431 and in Malaysian secular law under the Law Refonn 
(Marriage and Divorce) Act.432 
Not all of this similarity can be attributed to direct statutory bor-
rowing, for the doctrinal evolution was well underway before the Is-
lamic family law enactments were passed. Rather, the cases 
presented well defined, conventional opportunities for the usual com-
mon law development. Judges probably also found it inconceivable, 
knowing the secular law as they did, that Muslim wives should be left 
with less marital property than non-Muslim wives were. But with 
the direct borrowing of the harta sepencarian provisions from the 
marital asset provisions applicable to non-Muslims (which provisions 
bear some resemblance to those of the English Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973433), and with the confinnation of their liberal interpretation 
as a matter of Islamic law, the marriage of adat, English law, com-
mon law method, and Islamic law was consummated. A right 
originating in custom is framed in tenns similar to those of English 
law and reconceptualized as Islamic by statute and judicial decisions. 
Harta sepencarian is still emerging law, and it is also merging law-
an example of the strongest possible syncretism. 
427. See Suzanna Mohamed Isa, Harta Sepencarian: An Overview 56 (1991) (un-
published LL.B. Honours project paper, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia). 
428. See Hj. Salleh, supra n. 391, at 6-8. . 
429. See id. at 7; Suzanna, supra n. 427, at 36. See also Islamic Family Law (Fed-
eral Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 65(1) (right of divorced wife to receive main-
tenance ceases on adultery). 
430. See Abdul M~id, supra n. 394, at 34. 
431. See Suzanna, supra n. 427, at 48 n. 2. 
432. See id. at 56-59 (description of cases decided under the statute applicable to 
non-Muslims). 
433. C. 18, §§ 24-25. In section 24, however, the English act contains options be~ 
yond mere division of marital property; and, in section 25, it mandates that the courts 
take account of a wider range of circumstances than the Malaysian acts do. 
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2. Consolatory Gifts: Clarified Doctrine, Enhanced 
Enforcement 
563 
If these were the forces at work in harta sepencarian cases, a 
slightly different configuration has been involved in muta'ah cases. 
Until recently, there w~re few muta'ah claims, and the amounts re-
covered were trivial. Neither is true now. The computation of 
muta'ah waH regarded by courts and commentators as antiquated 
and conceptually impoverished. In recurrent cases, particular judges 
have taken the lead in spelling out the entitlement, and the growth of 
a Malay propertied middle class and a Shariah bar with financial in-
centives to bring larger claims has breathed new life into the law of 
consolatory gifts. In contrast to marital' property, the!3e develop-
ments have proceeded without explicit reference to the law applicable 
to non-Muslims, but they may still produce parallel results. 
No doubt the changing economic condition of the Malays since 
the 1970s-their increasing urbanization, representation in' com-
merce and the professions, and participation in the modern sector of 
the economy-also played a role in harta sepencarian doctrine. The 
more property is owned, the more claims to joint ownership are plau-
sible; Malays clearly own more now, particularly in and around Ku-
ala Lumpur, where ~uch of the new law is being made. 
The muta'ah obligation, however, is open-ended. Harta sepen-
carian requires a fractional share of a fixed quantum of property. 
The muta'ah statutes do not relate to specific property .. They simply 
require that a woman who "has been divorced without just cause" be 
paid an amount that is "fair and just," "appropriate and just," or "ap-
propriate and fair."434 The relevant Quranic verse requires divorced 
wives to be provided with a "gift of reasonable amount," from the 
"wealthy [husband] according to his means, and the poor according to 
his means."4.35 The principal inquiry is thus into the husband's abil-
ity to pay, and that ability is much greater than it formerly was. 
434. Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act' 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 56 ("fair 
and just"); Kelantan Islamic Family Law Enactment ,1983, No. l! of 1983, § 44 ("appro-
priate and just"); Kedah Islamic Family Law Enactment 1979, No.1 of 1984, § 47 
("appropriate and fair"). Only Malacca has no explicit requirement (though it is likely 
implicit) that the woman be divorced without just cause, and Malacca also does not 
specify that she be divorced by the husband, the implication being that she may initio 
ate the divorce and still receive muta'ah. Malacca Islamic Family Law Enactment 
1983, No.8 of 1983, § 44. Even if the wife is the plaintiff, she may still recover 
muta'ah if the divorce action is for taklik (since the husband's breach of condition 
would be wronl~ul), possibly even for khul', but perhaps not for fasakh. See Zalikhah 
binti Mohd. Nor, "Mut'ah di dalam Islam [Muta'ah in Islam]," 3 'J.H. 147, 153 (1983). 
See also Sharifah Sapoyah v. Wan AIwi, 6 J.H. 259 (Sarawak Chief Kadi's Ct. 1988) 
(muta'ah in taldik and khul' but not fasakh); Noor Bee v. Ahmad Shanusi, 1 J.H. 63 
(Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 1978) (muta'ah in khul' but not in fasakh); Zaitoon Dato' 
Othman, "Hak Wanita Menuntut Mutaah [Women's Rights to Claim Muta'ah]," 
Malays. L. News, Jan. 1993, at 8, 9 (no muta'ah in fasakh cases). 
435. The Glorious Quran, supra n. 305, at 94-95. 
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Several conventions formerly limited muta'ah. One was that 
muta'ah was voluntary, and at most the kadi could cajole a bit more 
out of the husband than he was initially willing to pay. Another was 
that the amount should not exceed half of the mas kahwin (dowry), 
which is relatively smallin Malaysia.436 A third was that muta'ah is 
a form of compensation for service that ought to vary with the length 
of the marriage: a common calculation was M$l for each day of the 
marriage. This is still the rule followed by some Shariah court judges 
in Singapore.437 
These inhibitions on muta'ah are not altogether gone in Malay-
sia, but they are going fast. Muta'ah is mandatory; its calculation is 
based on ability to pay; token payments are inadequate; and the dol-
lar-a-day rule has been expressly repudiated by an appeal commit-
tee.438 So vested is the right held to be that a wife's recalcitrance, 
which might deny her eddah maintenance, does not necessarily pre:. 
clude her claim to muta'ah,439 and her failure to cook or wash or care 
for her husband is deemed irrelevant, for these are not held to be 
obligatory chores.44o 
Some of these rules were laid down iri a series of eas~s decided by 
the Chief Kadi of Penang, Haji Harussani bin Haji Zakaria, in the 
late 1970s and early' 1980s. Long concerned with the proper imple-
mentation of Shariah,441 Haji Harussani proceeded to award muta'ah 
proportionate to the husband's ability to pay.442 The amounts were 
generally modest, but the Chief Kadi ofteri granted muta'ah even 
where the wife had initiated the divorce, provided the husband was 
unable to prove she was at fault in breaking up the marriage.443 In 
addition to ability to pay, the Chief Kadi also considered the status 
and positive demeanor of the wife; in one or two cases, the amounts 
seem to have been enhanced where wives had proved their devo-
436. See Zalikha, supra n. 434, at 150. 
437. Interviews, Singapore, January 28,29, 1993. 
438. Rokiah bte. Haji Abdul Jalil v. Mohamed Idris bin Shamsudin, [1989] 3 
M.L.J. ix, xii (Fed. Terr. App. Comm. 1989); Piah binti Said v. Che Lah bin Awang, 3 
J.H. 220 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct., 1983). 
439. Rokiah, supra n. 438, at xii. Contra: Zainoon v. Mohamed Zain, supra n. 394, 
at 113 (no muta'ah if wife deserts matrimonial home). The problem is that if the 
wife's recalcitrance is deemed to have caused the divorce she will be adjudged as not 
lacking in fault and so ineligible for muta'ah. 
440. Rokiah, supra n. 438, at xii. 
441. See the Haji Harussani Report, supra n. 182. . 
442. Piah, supra n. 438; Ramlah v. Mohamed, 1 J.H. 77 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 
1980); Zawiyah v. Raslan, 1 J.H. 91 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 1980); Rahmah v. 
Mohamed Yusofi', 1 J.H. 75 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 1979); Normaidiah v. Azhari, 1 
J.H. 91 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 1979); Rosnah v. Ibrahim, 1 J.H. 94 (Penang Chief 
Kadi's Ct. 1979); Sabariah v. Zainol, 1 J.H. 99 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 1979); Noor 
Bee, supra n. 434. 
443. Ramlah, supra n. 442; Rosnah, supra n. 442. 
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tion.444 Along the way, it was made clear that the consolatory gift 
was, not to remunerate services but rather to compensate for any em-
barrassment the wife might feel upon divorce, to avoid any rumors 
that· she was at fault, and to provide her with the wherewithal to 
start a new life.445 These are now the accepted underpinnings of 
muta'ah.446 
On such established rules are laid the foundations for much 
larger claim:;.447 In Kuala Lumpur, there have already been claims 
for as much as M$5 million.448 Particularly in the capital, where a 
Shariah bar experienced in secular litigation has developed, the fi-
nancial rewards of ,pursuing muta'ah are considerable. 
Muta'ah litigation is a source of procedural innovation. The 
Shariah courts are not accustomed to extended discovery, but the 
problem for lawyers seeking muta'ah for divorced wives is to locate 
and prove the husbands' assets. Lawyers are well aware of the provi-
sionsin the Islamic civil procedure enactments that if there is a la-
cuna the kadi is to resort to the civil rules applicable to the secular 
subordinate COurtS.449 In one major case, for example, an application 
has been made for further and better particulars to compel the hus-
band to disclose his assets.450 If assets have been located, some of 
them may be liable to attachment. Moreover, where the matter is 
lucrative, elaborate arguments, drawn from practice in the secular 
courts, are increasingly pressed on the kadis. 
, 'On the, other hand, husbands are also represented, and litigation 
planning can be practiced to avoid muta'ah. Assets can be trans-
ferred or placed in trust for children, so as to disadvantage a wife who 
makes chuDls on them.451 In all of these ways, litigation in the 
Shariah court stands to become far more complex. 
The last word has probably not been spoken on the standards for 
the award ofmuta'ah. If the kadi is to look ahead in making a consol-
atory award in a case where the husband is affluent, should the kadi 
444. Ramlah, supra n. 442 (half of husband's net salary for one month); Noor Bee, 
supra n. 434 (noting wife's dedication). 
445. Noor Bee, supra n. 434. 
446. See Nillgal alias Yang Chik bte. Hashim v. Jamal bin Abdul Rahim, [1989] 2 
M.L.J. xxix, xxxi-xxxii (Fed. Terr. App. Comm. 1988) (citing Penang cases with ap-
proval and enunciating similar rules); Zaitoon, supra n. 434 at 9-11; Zalikhah, supra 
n. 434, at 151-56. 
447. Cf. Nik Noriani Nik Badli Shah, Family Law: Maintenance and Other Finan-
cial Rights 36-37 (1993) (arguing that muta'ah awards should .be more substantial). 
448. Tengku Puteri Zainah v. Dato' Seri Mohd. Najib, Civil No. 41187 (Fed. Terr. 
Chief Kadi's Ct.). . . 
449. See, e.lt., Selangor Syariah Civil Procedure Enactment 1991, No.7 of 1991, 
§ 60(1). 
450. Tengku Puteri Zainah v. Dato' Seri Mohd. Najib, supra n. 448 (application 
filed July 22, 1.992). The kadi subsequently denied the application, but the general 
availability of procedural devices drawn from the secular sector remains. 
451. Here and elsewhere in this section, I have benefited from interviews with sev-
eral members I)f the Shariah bar in Kuala Lumpur. 
566 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 42 
consider what is needed for the wife to maintain herself beyond the 
eddah period, or should the kadi simply award a fraction of the hus-
band's assets, which is the way at least some lawyers representing 
wives plan and shape their demands? If muta'ah is designed to give 
the wife a fresh start, is it not a form of a quite non-Islamic lump-sum 
alimony? There is every reason to think that, with standards so inde-
terminate, there is much room for expansion of doctrine as well as of 
awards.452 
3. The Two Payments and the Sources of Change 
Together, liability for harta sepencarian and muta'ah may come 
increasingly to deter husbands from divorcing their wives.453 The 
doctrines, with their respect for housework and rejection of defenses 
based on the wife's recalcitrance, are obviously also reshaping rela-
tions between the sexes. Together, too, harta sepencarian and 
muta'ah may also help compensate for what is otherwise a harsh con-
sequence of the Islamic divorce regime: no maintenance beyond the, 
100 days of eddah. 
, If the two obligations work in tandem in this way, their revival or 
current strength derives from two contrasting sets of developments. 
Harta sepencarian is a creature of Malay adat, not of Islamic law, 
and it has been embellished and expanded through common law adju-
dication and complete adoption of the secular statute, whose roots are 
neither in adat nor in Islam. The main source of the change, in other 
words, is the adjacent English legal systeDl' Muta'ah, however, is a 
wholly Islamic obligation, the reconceptualization of which cannot be 
traced directly to adat or to common law. There is, for example, noth-
ing in explicit, established doctrine that makes muta'ah into a kind of 
Islamic alimony-a concept that does not exist. But muta'ah and the 
ability of kadis' courts to utilize what are for them new procedural 
techniques seem to be in a phase of incipient expansion by virtue of 
the importation of litigation techniques arid arguments from the 
same adjacent secular system. The spillover effects on the kadis' 
courts will be significant. 
In the one case, then, the law alone has expanded. In the other, 
the complexity of the Shariah court as an institution is also ex-
panding, as zealous enforcement of the clarified obligation increases. 
The effect of both, when the dollars have been added together, is to 
produce substantial changes in the de facto rights of divorced middle-' 
class Malay women. 
452. On the inadequacy of awards and the indeterminacy of standards for deciding 
on the appropriate amount, see Zaitoon, supra n. 434, at 11, 29. On muta'ah as a kind 
of de facto alimony in Morocoo; cf. Ziba Mir.Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: A Study of 
Islamic Family Law 90·91 (1993). 
453. Which is what such financial obligations are said already to do for middle' 
class Muslims. Azizah, supra n. 243, at 110. 
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V. LEGAL ACCULTURATION AND THE QUEST FOR AUTHENTICITY 
An old Italian maxim has it that "if things are going to stay the 
same around here, there are going to have to be some changes." The 
epigram doe8 not, of course, describe the far-reaching Malaysian 
changes, which were certainly not produced to make sure that the 
legal system stayed the same. Yet, beneath the cynicism of the apho-
rism is a flash of insight that does apply in Malaysia: the flood of 
changes is anchored to some deep continuities in the Malaysian legal 
system as a whole, and many of the Islamic changes have strong con-
nections to the secular law. 
To provide a truly satisfying explanation for the adoption and 
content of the new body of Islamic law of Malaysia, ~t is necessary to 
move beyond. the commonly articulated approaches to legal change 
and into more specific ' propositions concerning the selection of sources 
for legal innovation, the fit between borrowed rules and the system 
into which they are to be received, and the relations between sectors 
of dual legal systems. Above all, it is necessary to explore more fully 
a force that both motivates legal change and defines its scope: the 
quest for a legal system that is felt to be authentic. After a brief sum-
mation of how the main approaches fare against the Malaysian evi-
dence, we shall turn to a more serious treatment of issues 
surrounding borrowing, dualism, and authenticity. 
A. Approaches to Legal Change and the Mirror of Authenticity 
There is some evidence in the Malaysian materials for nearly 
every approach to legal change except the most deterministic. Con-
sistent with evolutionist concepts, there is ,developmental change, 
manifested by increased complexity, institutional differentiation, and 
the predominance of official, lawyers' law over earlier, less formal 
versions. Consistent with utilitarian presuppositions, there is room 
to interpret at least some doctrinal changes in functionalist terms. 
The central theme of utilitarian approaches-cost reduction-is not 
much in evidence, even in commercial law, where Islamic rules re-
garding interest may make transactions less efficient. But the expan-
sion of institutions such as harta sepencarian and muta'ah are 
compatible with a broadly conceived functionalist interpretation, in-
sofar as they provide ways for women to escape the potentially im-
poverishing consequences of Islamic inheritance and divorce law.454 
Consistent with social change approaches, some new rules have en-
countered resistance where opinion or practice is more traditional. 455 
Consistent with intentionalist views, the choice of specific rules and 
454. In part for such reasons, it appears, some countries with large Muslim minor-
ity populations have, by statute, repealed the Islamic rules of succession to property. 
See, e.g., AKP. Kludze, Modern Law of Succession in Ghana 229-36 (1988). 
455. See supra at 276, 279, 282, 288-89, 546. 
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institutions is made by lawyers acting with some degree of autonomy, 
albeit lawyers set in motion by politicians. Except insofar as extreme 
versions of some theories postulate truly invisible hands and auto-
matic processes, there is no necessary contradiction among the 
approaches. 
One reason that each approach has something pertinent to say 
but that none excludes alternatives to it is that the approaches are 
cast at different levels of analysis. The closer one looks at particular 
rules and institutions, the more dominant the role of intentional ac-
tivity seems to be. The more the emphasis is on overall patterns, the 
more plausible it is to explain. emerging configurations in terms of 
evolutionary imperatives or drives toward efficiency. At an interme-
diate level, differences of opinion and practice among states and so-
cial groups come more into focus. 
Take the growing formality of the system and role of trained law-
yers. The degree to ,which the transformation of Islamic law is char-
acterized by more elaborate procedural techniques and heightened 
professionalization is largely attributable to the particular choices 
made by the reformers. There is nothing inexorable about the growth 
of these characteristics. The more abstract evolutionary formulations 
neglect the incontestable fact that a different choice of reformers 
(ulama, for example) would have produced a completely different set 
of reforms, certainly one characterized by far less formality and infi-
nitely less common law borrowing. 
Or consider the role of changing opinion and social practice, 
which turns out to be quite complex. As indicated, differences of 
opinion and practice do account for the differential adoption of re-
forms among some of the Malaysian states, most notably Kelantan. 
But some other states chose one or another version of a statute much 
more because of professional networks among the reformers than be-
cause of any different distribution of opinion.456 Where social prac-
tice and opinion do playa role, it is easier, in some cases, to attribute 
resistance to innovation to the absence of social change than it is to 
attribute the choice of legal rules and institutions to any modifica-
tions of opinion ·or practice. Even then, a good many revised doc-
trines prevail even in the face of contrary opinion; on only a few 
issues is dissident public opinion aroused at all. Changes in opinion 
among elites, from which the reformers are drawn-on polygamy and 
equal rights to divorce, for example-appear considerably more im-
porta:Q.t than are even broadly-based changes in opinion among any 
other sectors. 
456. For example, former students of Professor Ahmed Ibrahim, a leading expo-
nent of the Federal Territory model, are located in key positions in many states. Like-
wise,large parts.ofthe Kelantan model appear to have been adopted in Perak because 
of the transfer of the Kelantan legal adviser to that state. 
1994] ISLAMIC LAW REFORM 569 
Furthermore, the sequence of change is the reverse of the one 
identified for the history of English divorce law by Lawrence 
Stone.457 In England, judges and then legislators sought to reduce 
the dissonance between law and the changing social conditions that 
brought the law into disrepute. In Malaysia, legislative drafters and 
a handful of appellate judges have imposed the changes on occasion-
ally-reluctant kadis, whose only sense of dissonance relates to the 
disparity between the new law and the prevailing Shafi'i doctrine. 
The English changes were bottom-up; the Malaysian changes have 
been top-down. 
No approach is without substantial opposing evidence, and even 
together the various approaches do not explain the Malaysian 
changes fully. The approaches are not wrong so much as they are 
inadequate, because they miss an issue that must playa major part 
in fundamental systemic change-and the more fundamental, the 
more major the part it must play: the iss~e of authenticity. A legal 
system does not need merely to promote efficiency, or to align particu-
lar doctrines with particular opinions or social practices, or to follow 
developmental imperatives, or to suit the knowledge and interests of 
lawyers and reformers. A legal system must be regarded as morally 
. appropriate for and by the people it governs.458 
Quite obviously, general notions about the moral inappropriate-
ness of the neglect of the Islamic sector of the legal system and its 
formal subordination to the secular sector motivated the Malaysian 
reforms. But the sense of inappropriateness does not determine 
which successor institutions will be held to be appropriate. The 
choice of those institutions can be a complex matter, and the Malay-
sian materials show it to be determined by (1) the identity of the re-
formers, (2) the strength of the adjacent legal system, (3) the desire of 
the reformers to create a new system comparable to it, and (4) the 
ability of the reformers to borrow from a variety of presumptively le-
gitimate repositories of rules and institutions. 
In all their efforts, the Malaysian reformers were abetted by the 
tolerance of the wider society-including the Islamic opposition459-
for an ecle.ctic reconstruction of. the Islamic legal system. If some 
ulama held a priori standards of Islamic purity, these were generally 
(but not always) overcome by the reformers' diligent pursuit of a sys-
tem of institutions that could match the secular system. Even Is-
457. See supra at 249-50. 
458. Compare Geertz's remark that authenticity is a sense that truth and false-
hood, virtue and vice are "appropriately aligned." Geertz, supra n. 37, at 231. 
459. Shariff! Zaleha, supra n. 128, at 6, notes, quite appropriately, that not even 
the dakwah (Illlamic revival) groups have challenged the version of Shariah produced 
by the "present carriers ofIslamic law." She implies that the reforms have legitimacy, 
a judgment amply supported by the overt approval or acquiescence that has greeted 
the vast majority of them. 
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lamic opposition politicians, who might have been expected to object 
to the borrowed content of many of the new legal norms, have been 
more than acquiescen.t. To be sure, they embarrassed the govern-
ment because of its failure to implement hudud punishments,460 and 
some of them had private reservations about the shift from informal 
to formal procedure or the threat that codification posed to legal exe-
gesis from original Islamic sotirces.461 Nevertheless, they understood 
that the government's reform of Islamic law was so generally satisfy-
ing to the Muslim population that it put the opposition in a difficult, 
defensive position. 
Pace Savigny, one conclusion that emerges with utmost clarity 
from the Malaysian materials is that to be authentic a legal system 
does not need. to be indigenous. If legal authenticity means that a 
people must be able to see itself in its law-and that is what it 
means-authenticity does not have a single face. 
B. Borrowing and Legal Dualism 
The quest for more authentic law utilizes techniques of borrow-
ing and transplantation; and, as Watson notes, the reformers are 
likely to borrow only from sources with which they are familiar. But 
in two respects the process goes beyond what Watson so well 
describes. , . 
First, the ability 'of the reformers to choose new law does not be-
long to them alone. They are working in collaboration with political 
leaders. The Malaysian borrowing would have been different if the 
agenda of the politicians had been different, and their agenda might 
have been different (and probably less extensive) had they faced less 
political competition. 
Second, the transplanting reformers were not merely reflecting 
professional bias in their choice of sources. They also had their eye 
on a larger set of issues. Although they nowhere articulated their 
standards in this way, the drafters and interpreters behaved, as if 
their product had to have several attributes: (1) It had to have an 
Islamic pedigree, a claim to derive from Islamic sources. (2) The 
product had to be what they would call, an up-to-date, upgraded ver-
sion-a guide to conduct and process (a) that is professionally coher-
ent and , interpretable through an orderly system of adjudication, (b) 
that, without sacrificing Islamic morality, is not blatantly oppressive 
toward women, and (c) that is as efficient in its methods as the secu-
lar law is. (3) It had also to be a force propelling Malay society, often 
460. See supra at 260-61. The federal government has recently made it clear that 
it will not support the constitutional amendment that would be required for Kelan-
tan's hudud statute to become effective. Cf. supra n. 149. 
461. I am drawing here on an interview with a prominent Islamic law expert affili-
ated to the opposition Parti Islam, Bangi, Selangor, March 12, 1991. 
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regarded by its elites as insufficiently attup.ed to the requirements of 
the modern world, toward competitiveness, pursuit of material well-
being, and characterological correctness (personal responsibility, up-
rightness, goal directedness). The modern character of the law was 
important to them. As a member of the Technical Committee wrote, 
one reason to keep open the door of ijtihad (discretion to interpret 
legal source!!) is to enable Islamic law to keep up with the times, lest 
it fall into disrepute.462 
This combination of implicit objectives explains much of the 
character of the reforms: the inclination to prefer progressive rules, 
drawn selectively from other Islamic schools and countries, to the un-
reconstructed Shafi'i law prevalent in Malaysia; the extraordinary ef-
forts to regularize courts, kadis, and appellate bodies, as well as rules 
of evidence and procedure, and to subject the courts to a doctrine of 
precedent; the outright hostility toward irresponsibly pronounced 
talaks, unequal divorce rights, polygamy, failure to pay zakat, and 
arbitrariness in judicial procedure. These vices all become moral 
faults in need of legal rectification as the quest for an a'l-lthentic law is 
linked to the search for a new Malay character. 
Moreover-and this is crucial-authenticity is enhanced if the 
authenticat.~d version stands up well to the competition. In the Ma-
laysian case, the competition is the secular legal system. Hence the 
willingness to borrow liberally from the secular side where Islam has 
not spoken and to adopt even some rules in contravention of Islamic 
rules. Amo:ng these is the common law prohibition on hearsay-a 
prohibition that, while not always enforced in court, meets in Malay-
sia with no principled Islamic objection whatever. 
On all this, the reformers are completely candid. A leading 
drafter, Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, describes the drafting process as 
starting with the secular law and modifying it only where Shariah 
requires a different rule.463 (In some cases, notably marital property, 
the process is better described as lifting of the secular rule verbatim 
and not modifying it even where Islamic law differs.) Another mem-
ber of the 1~echnical Committee describes the operative, permissive 
principle of rule borrowing: "If is not inconsistent [with Islam], we 
462. A. Monir, supra n. 327. Similar statements are legion. See, e.g., Abdullah 
Abu Bakar & Nadzim Abd. Rahman,' The Recent Development in Muslim Family 
Law: The Malaysian Experience 30 (unpuhlishedpaper presented at the Interna-
tional Shariah Conference on the Recent Developments in Muslim Family Law, Pusat 
Islam, Kuala Lumpur, Aug. 3-5, 1990) (need "to appreciate that Islam is capable of 
answering the challenges of time."). Abdullah and Nadzim endorse an eclectic search 
to insure that Islamic law keeps up; it is necessary, they say, "to dive into the sea and 
obtain the pearls of intellectual wisdom for [this] purpose." Id. On ijtihad in general, 
see Weiss, supra n. 23. 
463. Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Shariah and Codification-Malaysia Experience," 1987 
Shariah L.J. 47, 58. 
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take it as Islamic. "464 A leader of a powerful dakwah group agrees. 
The answers to modern problems are not found in classical sources or 
in the learning of ulama. Needing improvement, Islamic thought in-
cludes that which does not contradict Islam.465 Such a formulation 
licenses liberal borrowing. 
A close examination of the background arguments for Shariah 
and its reform in Malaysia reveals their antinomial, even mutually 
contradictory, quality. On the one side are claims that Islamic law is, 
contrary to stereotype, a developed system able to meet the chal-
lenges of modernity. Indeed, the general Islamic system is explicitly 
compared to the English system and not found wanting, even occa-
sionally found superior. Hence Ali Baharum, in a study of the con-
tractual capacity of minors, concludes that Islamic law is more 
flexible and subtle than the English law, which relies on a fixed age of 
majority.466 In a book on the law of misrepresentation, he shows that 
considerable overlap exists between English and Islamic doctrine, 
but he frequently points to a superior Islamic rule.467 In the same 
vein, some writers have suggested that the emerging Anglo-American 
rules on irretrievable breakdown of marriage have, "perhaps uncon-
sciously, marched in the direction of the Islamic Law of divorce based 
on the doctrine of shiqaq [unbridgeable marital discord]."468 But if, 
on this side, a certain defensive chauvinism is in evidence, on the 
other side is the recognition that Islamic law, though once a great 
system, languished with the worldwide decline of Islam. It had great 
moments in and after the time of the Prophet, again in Grenada and 
in the Ottoman Empire, but now it needs to be redeveloped.469 The 
464. The quotation is drawn from ali interview in Kuala Lumpur, April 15, 1992. 
Cf. Hashim Mehat, Syariah Sebaga: Satu Sumber Common Law Malaysia: Harapan 
dan Hakikat [Syariah as a Source of Malaysian Common Law: Hopes and Reality] 20 
(unpublished paper presented at the Seminar on Syariah and Common Law, Kuala 
Lumpur, Pusat Islam, 16-17 May 1992) (any custom widely and fully practiced, and 
not inconsistent with Islamic principles, is acceptable; citing-revealingly-harta 
sepencarian, which is difficult to reconcile completely with Islamic law). 
465. I am drawing here on a lengthy interview with a national leader of an influen-
tial Islamic organization, Bangi, Feb. 28, 1991. 
466. Mohd. Ali lfj. Baharum, "Minor Contract Under English and Islamic Law of 
Contract," 1 Jurnal Perundungan 46 (1989). 
467. Mohd. Ali Baharum, Misrepresentation: A Study of English and Islamic Con-
tract Law (1988). 
468. S. Jaffer Hussain, "Marriage Breakdown Under the Law Reform (Marriage 
and Divorce) Act, 1976, and in Islam: A Comparative View," 1 Int'l Islamic U. L.J. 
113, 138 (1989). See id. at 115. See also Ahmad Ibrahim, "Islamic Law in Malaysia," 
Malays. L. News, July 1992, at 24,27. 
In Malaysia, however, the sequence was the opposite, as the Islamic statutes con-
verged with the previously-enacted secular statutory provisions on divorce. See supra 
nn. 265-71 and accompanying text. 
469. Cf. Abdur Rahman Ibn Abdul Aziz al Qassim, "The Idea of .Codifying the 
Sharia Rules: Its Past, Present and Future," 3 Contemp. Jurisp. Res. J. (No.4) (Ri-
yadh) 21, 25 (Jan.-Mar. 1992) (Islam needs a "developed Islamic jurisprudence .... 
able to respond to the changing needs of contemporary life . . . . "). 
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only practicable way to do this is by borrowing. Do these conflicting 
arguments, taken together, not furnish a warrant for change that is 
simultaneouBly Islamic and English? Do they not together predict a 
hybridized law, drawing heavily on the competitor that is ahead? 
English law, in its Malaysian secular incarnation, is, then, the 
reference model for the reformers. Anyone who doubts the influence 
of the surrounding legal environment on the reformers should con-
sider that their view of an appropriately structured Islamic legal sys-
tem for Malaysia is even colored by the secular governmental system 
in which they find themselves. The secular court system in Malaysia 
is unitary-there are no state judges -and the presence of state Is-
lamic judiciaries creates a sense of dissonance that reinforces the re-
formers' desire to centralize the Shariah system and make it uniform. 
This is one of the most recurrent elements in their discourse,47o and 
it points to what they regard as unfinished business: the creation of a 
single Shariah system in Malaysia. 
It is not uncommon for perceived internal deficiencies to give rise 
to positive attitudes toward external norms.471 Nor, of course, is 
legal borrowing more generally uncommon. On the contrary, 
although thl~ frequency of borrowing varies from time· to time and 
place to plaee, borrowing is a longstanding method of legal change. 
AB R.H. Helmholz has shown, the common law borrowed defamation 
actions and bankruptcy statutes from the canon law in the sixteenth 
century, while at roughly the same time ecclesiastical lawyers were 
copying forms used in the royal courtS.472 In medieval Europe, linked 
by the lingua franca of Latin, borrowing across jurisdictions was com-
mon. Linguistic separation and ultimately the nationalism of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries seem to have created an excep-
tional situation in which borrowing was somewhat less common, but 
the more recent diffusion of legal ideas suggests that this has already 
changed.473 
Yet we continue to· know little about the conscious and uncon-
scious processes by which borrowing, seepage, and transplantation 
take place, and much of what we think we know is wrong.474 In a 
celebrated article, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law,475 Otto 
470. See, e.g., A. Monir, supra n. 327, at 23-24; Abu Hurairah, supra n. 318, at 54; 
Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 160, at xix; Chemo S. Jallow, supra n. 49, at 99. 
471. Merton & Kitt, "Reference Group Theory and Social Mobility," in Class, Sta-
tus and Power 409 (Reinhard Bendix & Seymour Martin Lipset eds. 1953). 
472. R. H. Helmholz, Canon Law and English Common Law 8-15 (Selden Society 
Lecture, July 5, 1982; 1983). 
473. See nn. 39-43, supra, and accompanying text. 
474. It is most certainly not true that "[l]egal transplants practically never work." 
Robert B. Seidman, The State, Law and Development 34 (1978). While it may be true 
thatthe law imported by Ataturk's Turkey was more effective in the commercial field 
than in family life, see Yehezkel Dror, "Law and Social Change," 33 Tulane L. Rev. 
787,799 (1959), the same is not true without considerable qualification in Malaysia. 
475. 37 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1974). 
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Kahn-Freund suggested that procedural law is hardest to transplant, 
because national characteristics get in the way, particularly the hab-
its of the bar, conservative as it often is with respect to modes of ' pro-
ceeding.476 The Malaysian Islamic case might seem to be in direct 
contradiction, since the secular English models of civil and criminal 
procedure, of evidence, of trial and appellate structure, and of com-
mon law adjudication were, with some modifications, imported across 
the boundary on a wholesale basis. This suggests a major distinction 
between external borrowing (across countries) and internal borrow-
ing (within countries). Dual systems within countries would seem to 
have no special difficulty borrowing procedural institutions across 
system boundaries, precisely for reasons of familiarity. In fact, every-
thing we know about dual systems suggests the hybridization of their 
judicial procedures, as well as of their methods of decision and their 
conceptual apparatus.477 
Several other characteristics of dual systems are manifest in the 
Malaysian case, which sheds light on the phenomenon of legal dual-
ism in general. As political power, shifts between the segments un-
derlying the dual system, there is 'often a tendency toward 
purification, an effort to cleanse excrescences and return to the per-
ceived original version. With the rise of resentment against English 
law, there was thus an effort to restore the unsullied civil law in Que-
bec and the Roman-Dutch law in South Africa to their original state 
and their rightful status.478 Typically, these efforts fail to pull the 
systems apart or to revive the legal status quo ante, although they 
may well alter the relative prestige of the two systems. An equal and 
opposite tendency is to end the duality itself, either by choosing deci-
sively one system over the other or by fusing the two. For legal posi-
tivists and centralists, dualism or pluralism is an "imperfect,» 
anomalous, state of affairs.479 The Malaysian evidence is strong that 
in a variety of ways dualism' creates discomfort and inconvenience 
among the participants, who move, when they can, to reduce the dis-
476. Id. at 20. 
477. van Blek, "The Genesis of the 'Modernist-Purist' Debate: A Historical Bird's-
Eye View," 47 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse ~eg 255, 260 (1984);, 
Howes, "From Polyjurality to Monojurality: The Transformation of Quebec Law, 
1875-1929," 32 McGill L.J. 523,530-31,534 (1987); Lemieux, "The Quebec Civil Law 
System in a Common Law World: The Seven Crises," 34 Juridical Rev. 16,27 (1989); 
White, "Some Problems of a Hybrid Legal System: A Case Study of St. Lucia," 30 Int'l 
& Compo L.Q. 862, 870 (1981); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Survival of Civil Law in 
North America 3-4 (unpublished remarks, mimeographed, no date). . 
478. See Howes, supra n. 477, at 547; van Blek, supra n. 477, at 256-60. 
479. Griffiths, "What Is Legal Pluralism?," 24 J. Leg. Pluralism 1,8 (1986). Dual 
legal systems are poorly understood by positivist theories, since in principle the single 
sovereign could abolish one of the parallel systems at will. See John Chipman Gray, 
The Nature and Sources of the Law 328 (2d ed. 1921). For the unifying tendency in 
Louisiana's early legal system, see George Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and, 
The Clash of Legal Traditions 168 (1975). 
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sonance between systems. The result is the Malaysian paradox-
which may not be atypical-that, even as the systems are pulled 
apart, restratified, and relegitimized, the dissonance between the 
rules and institutions of the two is reduced 'and their content actually 
converges. 
In the process of recovering authenticity through legal change, 
two impulse!! that seem at odds must ultimately find reconciliation. 
The first is the urge to ,purify, to recapture, to retrieve a sense of 
loss-in this case, lost law. The second is the urge to reduce the dis-
sonance between legal systems found in the same space, for, like 
other forms of dissonance, legal dissonance is, oftep. experienced as 
disturbing and unnaturaL 480 The reconciliation of these impulses-
purification through convergence, so to speak-takes place through 
the medium of comparison. An authentic law must have the ability 
to withstand comparative scrutiny-which is to say that the specific 
content of law deemed authentic may be less important'than that it 
catch up with the competition, even if that means appropriating some 
of its legal norms. Legal convergence can thus go hand-in-hand with 
the recovery of legal authenticity. ' " 
The means to dissonance reduction is the participation of reform-
ers active in both systems. ,However much they say they are in one 
system looking in at the other, in fact, as academics, they often write 
on both systems, and, as practitioners and drafters, too, they act in 
both.481 Accordingly, they find it easy to carry the assumptions of 
one system straight into the other. The institutions and habits of one 
system can come to infuse the work of another through a process of 
legal acculturation. . 
One function that the convergence of the two systems performs is 
to assuage, to some extent, the fear among nominally obser.vant, mid-
dle-class Malaysian Muslims that there will be a retreat to obscur-
antism. Among them, there is little respect for ulama, whom they 
often view as dropouts from the secular school system, and there is 
little confidence that the Islamic system is up to the demands of the 
modern world. They often see it as intruding on personal freedom-
the freedom to take an occasional alcoholic drink, for example-and 
they resent the constant drumbeat of support for it. 
Such views go further among some Malay members of the bar, 
whose admiration for British justice goes hand in himd with a certain 
disdain for their image of a traditional Islamic system. They would 
mourn the passing ofthe common law. Since the public expression of 
480. See generally Griffiths, supra n. 479; Dargo, supra n. 479. See also McKnight, 
"Some Historical Observations on Mixed Systems of Law," [1977] Juridical Rev. 179, 
184-86. . . ' 
481. For example, Professor Ahmad Ibrahim is an authority on the secular family 
law, as he is on Islamic law; Dr. M~nir Yaacob has written a general introduction to 
the Malaysian legal system, supra n. 114. I 
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their position would be understood as unacceptable opposition to Is-
lam, they sometimes express, in muted terms, sarcasm for the con-
formity enforced by those they see as sanctimonious opponents at the 
bar and in the intelligentsia, those who embrace Islamic virtue with 
conspicuous piety and so are able to dominate the surface level of 
debate. The eft'ortsof the reformers' to infuse the new Islamic law 
with common law concepts and procedures induce a sigh of relief 
among those who revere English law. 
Simultaneously, then, staunch proponents of Islam and detrac-
tors of Islamic law are mollified by a course of innovation that is 
heavy on the convergence of legal systems. There is even talk of a 
new Malaysian common law, to which English and Islamic practice 
could make the main contributions.482 
Now, of course, the content of the two systems does not converge 
in every way. But elements of divergence between the Malaysian sec-
ular and Islamic systems are not attributable to any revival oflapsed 
law on the Islamic side of the boundary. Long-lapsed law rarely re-
vives. Rather, new Islamic rules are borrowed from other Islamic 
source systems, alleged to have affinity with the borroWing system. 
In the Malaysian case, such Islamic source systems are found mainly 
in Pakistan, India, and Singapore.483 Although they sometimes 
speak of reviving "pure" Islamic law, the borrowers are actually look-
ing for desirable rules and institutions that can be imported from 
live, working systems. 
The choice of those systems, however, is significant. The main 
source coup.tries are also former British colonies, and all of them have 
been subject to similar transactions across the legal boundary be-
tween Islamic sacred and English secular. The geographically and 
linguistically proximate Islamic systems of Indonesia and the south-
ern Philippines are not altogether unknown,484 but they are signifi-
cantly less well known, more foreign in spirit, and less plausible as 
sources for borrowing. The style of the legislation borrowed and the 
mode of interpretation utilized in India, Pakistan, and Singapore are 
infused with a common-law ethos. And so even borrowing from exog-
enous sources operates to limit the divergence in conterit. The choice 
of source countries for borrowing can produce perverse results: what 
482. See A. Monir, supra n. 327, at 27. 
483. On the law of wills, Egyptian Islamic law is also to be utilized for certain 
substantive rules, though the procedural framework for probate is to be derived en-
tirely from the common law. 
484. See, e.g., the symposium on Islamic law in southeast Asia, [1985] Syariah L.J. 
1-123; Bustani Arifin, "The Administration of Shariah Laws in Indonesia," [1984] Sy-
ariah L.J. 15; Mastura, "The Administration of Muslim Personal Laws in a Muslim-
Minority Country," [1984] Syariah L.J. 25. See also Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Shariah 
Court and Its Place in the Judicial System," 5 Syariah L.J. 1,8-24 (1989) (discussing 
Pakistani and Indonesian cases). 
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looks familiar may turn out to be distant,485 and what looks distant 
may turn out to be familiar. 
There has been much academic discussion of the phenomenon of 
legal pluralism (including dualism), albeit·in the face of some uncer-
tainty about whether pluralism means the existence of two or more 
legal systems operating in a single state or merely two contending 
sets of norm:, with moral claims operating in a single environment.486 
In many ways, the Malaysian developments confirm and amplify 
much of the discussion of the interpenetration of parallel sectors, the 
imitation of one by the other, and the impulse to ultimate unifica-
tion.487 The Malaysian changes also suggest the fruitfulness of an 
insight, inadequately developed in such discussions, regarding the 
competition between sectors.488 Depending on the extent to which 
jurisdiction :is overlapping, the courts of two systems in close proxim-
ity may actually compete for business by attempting to offer more 
desirable procedures or rules of decision. This is not unknown where 
secular and Islamic systems have had overlapping jurisdiction, as for 
example in the lively competition for divorce cases between secular 
and Islamic courts in coastal Kenya,489 and it was not uncommon in 
England when ecclesiastical and common law courts were entertain-
ing alternative actions.49o Neglected by utilitarian theorists, this 
competition can be an engine for change, even for a certain efficiency. 
In one respect, however, discussion of legal pluralism has been 
counterproductive. Law, it is said, "encodes ... asymmetrical power 
relations,"491 and legal pluralism implies the inequality of the sys-
tems adjacent to each other.492 But to insist too strongly on this 
point-to suggest "that the whole phenomenon is reducible to but an-
other chapter in the history of oppression: who swindles whom, 
when, where, and how"493-is to underestimate the capacity for 
485. In South Africa, for example, in the first half of the twentieth century, when 
Afrikaner jurists sought to purify their Roman-Dutch law of common law excres-
cences, they turned to the European continent, thinking it natural to refresh their 
system from European roots; but the post-Napoleonic system may have had less affin-
ity with the pre-code Roman-Dutch system than did the common law they were trying 
to escape. See Baxter, "Pure Comparative Law and Legal Science in a Mixed Legal 
System," 16 Compo & [nt'l L.J. So. Afr. 84, 95-96 (1983). 
486. See, e.g., Bell, "A Perspective on Legal Pluralism in' 19th-Century New 
Brunswick," 37 U. New Bruns. L.J. 86,88 (1988); von Benda-Beckmann, "Comment 
on Merry," 22 L. & Soc'y Rev. 897,898 (1988). 
487. See Griffiths, supra n. 479, at 8 (possibility of unification); Merry, "Legal Plu-
ralism," 5 L. & Soc'y Rev. 869,877-81 (1988) (interpenetration and imitation). 
488. Merry, supra n. 487, at 882. 
489. See Susan F. Hirsch, Gender Differences in Disputing Strategies Among 
Coastal Kenyan Muslims 12 (unpublished paper, Chicago, 1987) (women increasingly 
choosing government courts). 
490. Stone, supra n. 85, at 24-27. 
491. Starr & Collier, supra n. 103, at 6. 
492. Id. at 9; McKnight, supra n. 480, at 184. 
493. Geertz, supra n. 37, at 220. 
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changing the hierarchy of legal systems and especially to underesti-
mate the paradoxical methods by which such changes are conceived 
and brought to term. English law has been more prestigious in Ma-
laysia, and it is precisely by burrowing into the system of English law 
and appropriating its norms for the new Islamic project that the re-
formers have changed, among other things, the relative prestige of 
the two systems., 
C. . Driving in Two Lanes: Legal Syncretism and Authenticity 
All efforts to recover lost authenticity are inevitably futile, but 
the direction of the fiction that is indulged along the way varies enor-
mously. In many post-colonial societies, as nationalism broadened 
out beyond the most acculturated elites, powerful movements arose 
to recapture local languages, religions, and cultural practices. A con-
scious rejection of imported forms sent the proponents back, in Albert 
Memmi's vivid formulation, "to frozen traditions, to a rusted 
tongue. "494 In this revolt, the person escaping colonization "will 
forego the use of the colonizer's language, even if all the locks of the 
country turn with that' key; he will change the signs and highway 
markings, even if he is the first to be inconvenienced."495 This forci-
ble reconstruction of institutions is one path, but it is, as Memmi 
notes, merely a phase. In law, especially, the resurrection of 
precolonial institutions soon proves unsatisfying, for those who si-
multaneously want economic development, with its complex financial 
transactions, or improved social conditions, with their concomitant 
regulation of family life and interpersonal relations. And so, in law, 
the quest for morally appropriate institutions eventually incorpo-
rates at least some of what is imported. All authenticity is fictive, but 
the content of the fiction-the mix of the elements-is not a given. 
Nor is the success of such a legal reform a foregone conclusion. 
Sometimes the imported law simply cannot acquire a hold on legiti-
macy. Its legal requirements may be at odds with common patterns 
of behavior, as imported family law is said to be in Thailand,496 or 
they may be so threatening to social relations as to stir active resIst-
ance and what amounts to counter-mobilization.497 ,Yet it is abun-
dantly clear that the success of a reform is not dependent on its 
isomorphism with preexisting legal norms or its compatibility with' 
specific features of the culture. The Malaysian reforms, to be sure, 
avoided some wholesale conflicts with Malay culture by incorporating 
494. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized 137 (1965). 
495. Id. 
496. See David M. Engel, Code and Custom in a Thai Provincial Court 171-78 
(1978). 
497. Massell, "Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Mi-
lieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia," 2 L. & Soc'y Rev. 179,201,205,217,222-27, 
(1967). 
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elements of adat, such as harta· sepencarian (though they trans-
formed it as they incorporated it); but they also challenged what 
Malays had become accustomed to, in taxation, divorce, payments to 
rejected wives, and the doctrine of female recalcitrance, among other 
things. By upgrading the kadis' courts and their procedure, they 
made it certain that litigants and others who had contact with those 
courts would be less comfortable with them and would not find them 
"indigenous." None of this seems to have stirred significant rejection. 
It may well be more important that a reform tap a powerful aspi-
ration to modernity or find a home in an unusually adaptable culture, 
whatever the particular practices of that culture.498 The receptivity 
to the reforms among the Malays may reside in their aspiration to be 
simultaneously Muslim ·and up-to-date as well as in their history of 
syncretism. Anyone who has driven on the roads of Malaysia has no-
ticed the extent to which Malaysians do not observe lane discipline 
but float flexibly on and across lane dividers, and many observers 
have commented on the highly syncretic character of Malay culture, 
including a considerable ability to live with contradiction. If Islamic 
law in Malaysia is a capacious system, far from p·rimal absolutes and 
far from the stereotype of the Shariah as rigid, fixed, immutable, and 
medieval, perhaps that is because the Malays have an unusual abil-
ity to drive in two lanes, to avoid making decisive choices between 
two systems. Where tolerance for ambiguity is high, thete may be 
more scope for directed change using eclectic sources of law .. 
Generally, the ability to live with contradiction is a trait hospita-
ble to legal change. No doubt it can conduce to the adoption of inc om-
patible elements, carelessly pieced together in the legal fabric; But 
the benefits seem greater. This sort of tolerance permits a legal sys-
tem to avoid dogmatism and to reject institutions that might other-
wise appeal on grounds of mere consistency. It is, in short, conducive 
to wide-ranging choice of rules and institutions and to pragmatism. 
In this flexibility there also lurks a deeper danger. As I have 
mentioned, there has been discussion in Malaysia of centralizing Is-
lamic law, of synthesizing it with English law to produce B; new, over-
arching Malaysian common law, ultimately removing un-Islamic 
features from statutes, and then, perhaps, breaking down the barrier 
between the secular law and the Islamic law altogether. Something 
like this is the common dream of all who are uncomfortable with dual 
legal systems. So far it is merely a gleam in the eye of the unifiers. 
The implication, however, is that even non-Muslims might be 
subject to the newly unified law, although they have not participated 
498. This is the argument of Nicholson, "Change Without Conflict: A Case Study of 
Legal Change in Tanzania," 7 L. & Soc'y Rev. 747; 748-49, 760 (1973) (Sukuma were 
adaptable and appreciative of modern institutions that displaced customary courts). 
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in the recreation of the Islamic sector.499 One argument has it that if 
non-Muslims can accept one foreign system, which they seem to pre-
fer-namely, the English-derived system-why could they not accept 
a system equally foreign to them but having Islamic features? 
Law, remarks Geertz, prospers "if it c~n compass dis sensus 
.••• "500 The test of Islamic law will be its long-term coexistence with 
some version of the secular system, for the displacement of that sys-
tem would disconcert non-Malays and religiously less observant 
Malays as well. For good reason, legal pluralism is likely to endure 
in many countries.501 A large, if understandable, error of those who 
drive in two lanes is to project equivalent adaptability onto others 
and to assume that what has become, after a lengthy quest, authentic 
and familiar, however eclectically it was created, can find easy and 
unequivocal acceptance among people whose own search for authen-
ticity may begin and end elsewhere. 
499. But see Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 468, at 27-28. Professor Ahmad suggests a 
much more limited possibility with respect to family law alone: ultimately, a uniform 
statute for all Malaysians, given the convergence of Islamic and secular norms in this 
field, but enforced in separate Islamic and secular courts. Presumably, the divorce 
provisions would rest entirely on irretrievable breakdown, rather than khul', taflik, 
or even fasakh. If irretrievable breakdown functioned effectively for men and women, 
the other grounds would be largely redundant. 
500. Geertz, supra n. 37, at 219. 
501. Id. at 220. 
